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M
’ost explanations of tlie decline in the real ean~ings of American
workers and of the rise in earnings inequality here in the 1980s
.and 1990s focns on factors that shift the demand for and the
supply of labor. On the demand side, the favorite shifters are technical
change, notably computerization, and trade, especially trade with less
developed countries, both of which can contribute to deindustrialization
of employment (an earlier favorite shifter). On the supply side, the
favorites are the decelerated growth in the number of college graduates
relative to less educated workers, and the influx of low-skill immigrants.
The influx of women into the work force has been mentioned as an
additional possible factor.
Each of the popular causes of change has its supportive evidence; for
a summary, see Levy and Murnane (1992). Each also has its evidentiary
problems.
¯ If our labor market problems are due to technical change, why has
productivity growth been so modest, and why has that growth not
translated into higher real wages, as in the past?
¯ If the cause of inequality is exclusively imports from less developed
countries, how does a mere 2 to 3 percent of the economy dominate
wage-setting, and why have women, who disproportionately work
in industries that compete with LDC imports, not suffered the huge
losses of real wages that hit men? Why has the proportion of skilled
workers risen in all sectors, despite the contraction of low-skill-
intensive, import-competing sectors that displace low-skill labor to
other parts of the economy?
¯ If the 1980s’ decelerated growth in the supply of college graduates
was so important, why has the accelerated gro~vth of the 1990s not
reduced the college/high school earnings gap?
¯ If immigration harms native workers, why have natives in immi-
grant-intensive cities not suffered huge wage or employment losses?
¯ Finally, if the cause is any or all of these, why has pay inequalityrisen within all detailed occupations--among
waiters, laborers, carpenters, mathematicians--
groups subject to technical change and trade,
groups not so subject, and so on? Why have
earnings differentials increased within all deciles
of the earnings distribution?
Explaining a major economic change is no easy
matter. The argument in this paper is not that the
usual suspects are innocent. I believe that they have
contributed to the rise in inequality and that some of
the preceding questions can be answered satisfacto-
rily. Rather, my argument is that the shortcomings
noted above (and others) show that, even taken to-
gether, the suspects fall short of offering a full expla-
nation of the extraordinary rise in inequality. This
suggests that we should widen the range of suspects.
My cm~didates for additional suspects are changes
in labor market institutions, notably the decline in
Candidates for additional causes
of the rise in income inequality
are changes in labor market
institutions, notably the decline
in collective bargaining, and
the reduction of the government
role in the job market.
collective bargaining, and the reduction of the govern-
ment role in the job market, evinced, for instance, in
the reduced real value of the minimum wage. Changes
in labor market institutions have, I arg~e, contributed
to the rise in inequality overall and to the increase in
inequality within groups that other factors cannot
readily explain. My claim is not that institutions are
everything. Rather, my claim is that changes in the
institutional structure are a contributing factor to the
earnings problem, and that the evidence for their
effects is at least as strong and arguably stronger than
the evidence for the other proposed causal factors. I
leave it to others to speculate why many economists
and goverlm~ent officials give short shrift to institu-
tions in explaining the failure of the U.S. economy to
reward workers in the past two decades.1
My claim rests on three bodies of evidence:
1) Cross-country evidence that labor market insti-
tutions largely explain the difference in earnings in-
equality between the United States and other ad-
vanced countries. A factor that explains cross-country
differences in inequality merits serious attention as
an explanatory factor of changes over time.
2) Shift-share calculations that show declining
union representation to account for at least one-fifth of
the rise in earnings differentials and dispersion of pay
within groups.
3) Evidence from analyses of the shape of earn-
ings distributions that the declh~ing real minimum
wage has contributed to the rise in inequality, to which I
would add the cotmterfactual assessment that the failure
of the govermnent to lean against the market wind has
also played a role in the observed trend.
Some may object to the theme of this paper on the
grounds that institutions are mere epiphenomena--
the smokescreen through which market forces oper-
ate. If the labor market of the past two decades had
been at full employment and competitive pressures
put every firm on the knife-edge of existence, with no
discretion in pay policy, I would take this objection to
heart. But a wide body of research has shown that
industries and firms have scope for independent pay
policies, be it because they have economic rents or
because they can strike innovative, efficiency-wage
contracts. And it is difficult to characterize the past
two decades of sluggish economic growth and rates
of joblessness as full employment. Displaced workers
cannot readily obtain jobs at their previous pay, and
even huge wage reductions have left jobless large
proportions of the less-skilled. In a world with rents
and pay discretion, and with labor market slack,
institutions have greater scope to affect outcomes than
in tight job markets.
h~ any case, the evidence provides a compelling
set of facts to add to the story of this epoch of in-
creased inequality.
Claim 1: Labor Market Institutions Explain
the U.S. Lead in Earnings Inequality
First, for the fact: the United States leads the
industrialized world in earnings inequality. Figure
1A, based on OECD data, makes this clear. The ratio of
the earnings of the top decile of American full-time
~ The 1994 Economic Report of the President notes that several
studies conclude that the decline of unionization accounts for about
20 percent of the increase in inequality, but this point did not gain
much attention (Council of Economic Advisers 1994, p. 120).
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decile is far greater here than h~ other countries. A
major reason for this is the low pay of Americans in
the lower income deciles. Figure 1B shows that work-
ers in the bottom decile earn just 37 percent of the
median wage in the United States, compared to 60 to
76 percent of the median in most other countries.
Since, on average, Americans earn only moderately
more than Europeans in purchasing power parity of
pay (we earn a lot less at current exchange rates than
workers in several other countries), the disparity in
The United States leads the
industrialized world in
earnings inequality.
earnings at the bottom translates into markedly lower
real earnings for poorer Americans. A full-time Amer-
ican worker in the bottom decile of our earnings
distribution earns per hour, for instance, less than half
of what a comparable German worker earns, and
three-quarters as much as a comparable British worker
(Freeman 1994).
The position of the United States as the industri-
alized world’s leader in earnh~gs inequality is not
unique to these earnings distribution data. During
the 1980s and 1990s, educational differentials widened
in the United States to create exceptionally large
premia for the more educated. In the 1960s and 1970s,
industrial wage differentials widened to produce an
exceptionally wide interh~dustry wage structure. The
United States also has large size-of-firm pay differen-
tials and large differentials in pay by age (Japan has
sizable differentials here, too). Differentials among
women are exceptionally large here (although the
male advantage in pay has dropped), and so too are
differentials among young workers just entering the
job market (although the age or experience premium
has risen). Moreover, data on frh~ge benefits--pen-
sions, medical insurance, and the like--show that
low-paid U.S. workers have fewer benefits than high-
paid U.S. workers, adding to the inequality in money
compensation. Finally, data on family incomes, be-
fore-tax or after-tax, show this country at or near the
top in overall income inequality. And, we are far
ahead of comparable countries h~ child poverty,
whether measured in relative terms or, as I prefer, in
absolute family earnh~gs adjusted for purchasing
power parity. At the other end of the spectrum, the
United States rewards its CEOs more relative to em-
ployees than do other countries; academic economists,
bankers, and rap singers also do fine, thank you.
The facts on inequality are clear and beyond
dispute. Even before the rise in h~equality h~ the 1980s
and 1990s, the United States had a more dispersed
distribution of pay than other countries. Before trying
to explain the rise of inequality h~ the United States
over time, it will be frt~itful to see what tmderlies the
greater inequality here at any point in time.
People or Wage-Setting h~stitutions?
Two possible explanations can be offered for high
earnings inequality in the United States. One possibil-
ity is that this inequality reflects our diversity: the
not-quite-complete mixing of ethnic groups. After all,
unlike homogeneous Sweden or Germany or Japan, or
the Netherlands, or Italy, we are a diverse people with
differing cultures, education, ethnic backgrounds, liv-
ing in diverse regions on a large continent. Surely,
a diverse society can be expected to generate more
inequality in pay.
A second possibility is that U.S. inequality reflects
the way pay is determined here~our great reliance on
market forces compared to labor market institutions,
versus other advanced countries. Unlike most of
OECD-Europe, we have a "thh~" structure of labor
market institutions: We do little to regulate pay by
statute, we have no employer federations to speak of,
and we use collective bargainh~g less than virtually
every other country.
Is it the people or is it the wage-setting institu-
tions that produce h~equality, at U.S. levels? To find
out, I proposed the following experiment. From a
population of babies from an advanced European
country, randomly select a few and move them to the
United States. Then watch those babies grow up and
reach workh~g age. Compare their distribution of
earnings to that of a "control group" of brothers or
sisters in the old country. If inequality is in the people,
we will find no difference in the spread of earnings
between the experimental and control groups. If in-
equality is in pay-setting, we will find large differ-
ences. Now, reverse the experiment with American
babies: Take a sample, send them overseas, and watch
as the babies grow up, enter the job market, earn a
living. Will the American babies have as great an
inequality in earnings overseas as h~ the United States?
Is inequality h~ us, or is it in wage-setting and other
social institutions?
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dation discouraged my undertaking this experiment,2
so I will report to you the results of the closest
approximation I could make using nonexperimental
data--a pseudo-experiment. My pseudo-experiment
compares the distribution of earnings of U.S.-born
men of Swedish descent working in the United States
with the distribution of earnings of men of Swedish
descent working in Sweden. By looking at the descen-
dents of Swedish immigrants rather than at immi-
grants, I eliminate the danger that the data ~vill be
driven by the selectivity of immigrants.3
To identify persons of Swedish background in the
United States, I used the "ancestry" question in the
U.S. Census of Population. In 1990 the question was:
"What is this person’s ancestry or ethnic origin?" The
coding allows persons to report two ancestry groups
(for example, German-Irish). I extracted from the 1990
Census the record of all men who listed Swedish
ancestry and obtained a sample of 53,468 observa-
tions. For comparison, I also extracted a random
sample of 98,181 Americans of whatever ancestry.
These samples are sufficiently large to provide reason-
ably accurate measures of earnings and incomes dis-
tributions.
On the Swedish side, my co-worker, Anders
Bjorklund, extracted a sample of persons with Swed-
ish parentage who grew up in Sweden (which elhni-
nates immigrants and the children of immigrants)
from the leading socioeconomic survey of individuals
for that country.~ The number of observations is
considerably smaller than those in the U.S. samples,
but still sufficient for the pseudo-experiment (Bjork-
lund and Freeman 1996).
Table 1 presents the results of this analysis in
terms of the 90/10 and 10/50 percentiles of hourly
earnings ratios for male workers. The line labeled all
U.S. men gives the distributional measures for Amer-
icans, regardless of ancestry. The line labeled U.S. men
of Swedish ancestry gives the same statistics for per-
2 My suspicion is that the National Science Foundation felt the
study team should have had M.D.s or Ph.D. biologists rather than
economists on it.
3 This leaves the dangers of selectivity among the immigrant
parents (which the}, pass on to their children through genes and
home environment), and of possible differences as to which parents
have children, between Swedes in Sweden and in the United States.
My suspicion is that selectivity among immigrant parents would
produce a less dispersed distribution of children here than in
Sweden, as immigrants usually come from one social group rather
than being a random sample of persons in the sending country. I
have no idea about the differential behavior of Swedes h~ Sweden
and of Swedish immigrants in the United States.
4 This is the LNU survey, or the Survey of Living Conditions.
Table 1
Hourly Earnings Differentials for Men,
Sweden and United States, 1989 to 1991
Ratio of Earnings, Ratio of Earnings,
90lh Percentile to 10th Percentile to
10th (90/10) Median (10/50)
All U.S. Men 5.53 .39






Source: Bjorklund and Freeman (1996).
sons of full Swedish descent in the United States. The
line labeled Swedish men in S~veden refers to persons
of Swedish ancestry working in Sweden, while the line
labeled non-Nordic men in Sweden refers to persons
of non-Nordic ancestry working in Sweden.
When we first conceived these calculations, I
anticipated that the men of Swedish descent in the
United States would have a distribution of earnings
narrower than that of other Americans but wider
than that of Swedes in Sweden. They were, after all,
more homogeneous than the "average" American. I
planned to use the differences to calculate a kind of
heritability (both genetic and environmental) coeffi-
cient for earnings dispersion. But, as you can see, such
an analysis would have no point: Persons of Swedish
descent living in the United States have a dispersion of
earnings similar to that of other Americans--a distri-
bution utterly unlike that of Swedes in Sweden.
Too few descendents of American immigrants
live in Sweden to permit the reverse experiment, but
Bjorklund noted that we could examine how adults
born of all immigrants fare in Sweden. Contrary to
the image of homogeneous Sweden, 15 percent of
Swedish residents aged 20 to 64 reported in 1991 that
one or both their parents were not Swedish citizens
at birth; many said that the language at home
was something other than Swedish; and half of them
said it was a non-Nordic language (Bjorklund and
Freeman 1996). We tabulated the hourly earnings
distribution for all 20- to 64-year-old adults who
reported that at least one parent was not Swedish and
that the language at home was neither Swedish nor
another Nordic tongue. The 90/10 and 10/50 ratios
of earnings for these descendents of immigrants are
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in Sweden. The Swedish system of wage determina-
tion produces a dispersion of earnings among those
with foreign parentage comparable to that of other
Swedes.
Sweden is, to be sure, more committed to egali-
tarianism than other capitalist countries. The most
conservative Swedes are "off the map" of American
political life by their desire to give the poor a decent
living standard. But while Sweden is at the top of the
scale in reducing pay differentials (Figure 1), it is not
an outlier. Its distribution of earnings is comparable to
that of other advanced European countries; it is in its
tax and transfer policies that Sweden differs from
other European Union countries. The United States is
Americans have unequal earnings
because we have a wage-setting
system that produces inequality.
The earnings distribution
resides in the institutions
that set pay in our country.
the outlier. If we performed the same "pseudo-exper-
iment" comparing Americans of French, or German,
or Italian or whatever parentage with their peers born
in the old country, I predict that the results would
mimic those for Swedish-Americans. Americans have
unequal earnings because we have a wage-setting
system that produces inequality. The earnings distri-
bution is not "in us" nor "in our stars" but resides in
the institutions that set pay in our country.
What Are Those h~stitutions?
In the United States, pay in the private sector is
largely determined by companies subject to market
constraints. Only a modest proportion of workers
have their pay set by collective bargaining, and few
have their pay set by industrywide bargaining with an
employers’ federation that covers all firms. Govern-
mental pay rules, such as minimum wages or manda-
tory extension of collective bargaining (whereby the
government extends the terms of a collective bargain
to firms and workers not party to the bargain), also
affect only a small number of U.S. employees. And the
proportion of the work force in the public sector is
less than in most other countries.
We are not the only country that relies on the
decentralized market to determine pay. The United
Kingdom and Canada also rely heavily on markets,
although they have larger union movements and
greater public sector employment than we do. With a
modestly sized and declining firm-based union move-
merit, Japan might also fit into this grouping, but
perhaps not: Japan’s Shunto Offensive for wage-set-
ting and in general the Japan, Inc. corporate behavior
have led some analysts to classify it with Europe’s
more centralized labor systems. All of these coun-
tries-the United States, the United Kingdom, Can-
ada, and Japan--are among the top five in inequality
in Figure 1, although Japan is comparable to OECD-
European countries in having a fairly moderate differ-
ential between the median worker and the 10th decile
worker.
By contrast, in Western Europe (save the United
Kingdom and Ireland), most pay setting is by labor
market institutions. Collective bargaining sets the pay
of 92 percent of workers in France, of 68 percent in
Spain, of 95 percent in Finland, of 90 percent in
Germany (OECD 1994, Table 5.8). In some countries,
bargaining takes place at a national level, though tl~is
is declining in importance. In most cotmtries, it occurs
at an industry or industry-region level. In France,
minimum wages are also important, since the govern-
ment has set the basic minimtm~ at about 60 percent of
the average pay (compared to a U.S. minimum of
about 35 percent of hourly earnings in manufacturing
in recent years). Finally, government employment
tends to be large in many European countries, so that
public pay policies affect national wage determination
to a substantial extent. Katz and Krueger (1991) show
that, in the United States at least, public sector pay is
less dispersed thaa~ private sector pay and pay in-
equality increased much less in the public sector than
in the private sector in the 1980s.
Institutional pay-setting reduces inequality by
three mechanisms. First, institutional determination
compresses pay within a firm. Unions, in particular,
seek to establish pay by rules rather than by manage-
ment discretion. As a result, pay differences among
union workers are smaller than pay differences among
otherwise comparable nonunion workers in all coun-
tries for which we have data (Freeman 1982).
Second, institutional wage determination, espe-
cially industry bargaining with mandatory extension
of collective bargaining agreements, reduces differ-
ences in pay among establislm~ents. As a result of such
162 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewextensions, union/nonunion differentials in European
countries are modest compared to the differentials in
the United States (Blanchflower and Freeman 1992).
Third, for ;vhatever reason, institutional pay-
setting reduces industry differentials. The United States
and other decentralized wage-setting cotmtries have
greater differences in pay across industries compared to
cotmtries that rely on institutions to set pay, including
those that make extensive use of industry bargaining.
The "deeper" reason that underlies all of these
relations is that institutions operate on averages; they
Institutions operate on averages;
they represent average workers or
firms, whereas markets operate on
margins; they represent the
pressure of supply and demand on
the marginal firm or employee.
represent average workers or firms, whereas markets
operate on margins; they represent the pressure of
supply and demand on the marginal firm/employee.
Institutions are insurance mechanisms for employees
and firms; they may reject changes that reduce the
well-being of the average employee/firm even though
this change fits with the marginal calculus.
The 1980s and 1990s were a good period to assess
the difference in market and institutional pay-setting.
When supply and demand operate to reduce inequal-
ity, market and institutional ~vage-setting produce
changes in the same direction (as in the 1950s and
1960s), and it takes a subtle analyst to discern their
relative importance. When, by contrast, supply and
demand operate to increase differentials (as in the
1980s and 1990s), markets move rapidly in that direc-
tion, while institutions "lean against the wind."
Claim 2: Declining Unionization Is a
Big Cause of Rising Inequality
Unionization declined precipitously in the U.S.
private sector from the 1970s through the 1990s. In
most advanced countries, unionization grew in the
1970s as workers sought protection from inflation,
then fell in the 1980s and 1990s, though only to levels
at or above those in the 1960s. Here the decline was
continuotts, with the private sector fall overwhelming
a rise in public sector unionization in the aggregate.
As a result, the United States was fttrther from the
OECD mean unionization rate in the 1990s than in
earlier decades.
But changes in union density have different con-
sequences for collective bargaining among countries.
As the United States does not rely on industry-level
bargaining nor extend collective bargaining contracts
within an industry,5 the decline in density translates
into a decline in coverage and thus in institutional
wage-setting. By contrast, even in European countries
where union density dropped sharply, such as the
Netherlands, the percentage of workers covered by
collective bargaining barely clianged. Why? One rea-
son is that firms remained part of their sector’s em-
ployers’ association, which obligated them to follow
the contract the association bargained ~vith the union.
A second reason is that mandatory extension la~vs
required firms that were not members to abide by the
conditions of the contract in their sector. The bottom
line is that declh~ing unionization had a much greater
effect on earnings outcomes in the United States than
in European countries.
How much of the increase in earnings inequality
here might we attribute to the decline in collective
bargaining coverage? One way to ans~ver this ques-
tion is to conduct a shift/share analysis, weighting
observed changes in coverage by estimates of the
effect of coverage on pay outcomes. In the U.S. private
sector, collective bargaining produces higher wages
for blue-collar employees and reduces white-collar/
blue-collar pay differences, by roughly the same
amount. From 1973 to 1993 union coverage fell by
roughly 20 points. Assume that the union wage dif-
ferential was 25 percent and that union ~vage gains did
not spill over to other employees. Then, a 20-point
drop in coverage would lower the pay of blue-collar
workers by 5 percentage points (= 20 × .25). This
is about one-half of the increased white-collar/blue-
collar differential among men (Freeman 1992). Since
college and high school graduates are found in both
white-collar and blue-collar jobs, the power of the
decline in unionization to explain the rise in the
college/high school wage premimn is smaller: it ac-
counts for about one quarter of that change (Black-
burn, Bloom, and Freeman 1990; Freeman 1992).
5 Save for the Davis-Bacon Act, which the government inter-
prets as requiring that federal contractors pay going union wages in
most cases.
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bargaining coverage is also associated with lower
dispersion of earnings among covered workers. Re-
duced collective coverage thus offers one possible
explanation for the increase in within-group inequal-
ity. Multiplying the 20-point drop in collective cover-
age by the esthnated effect of ul~ionization on disper-
sion of pay within sectors (measured by the standard
deviation of the logarithm of wages), I esthnate that
about 20 percent of the rise in overall dispersion can
be attributed to the drop in unionization. Note that
this is only a rough estin~ate of the determinants of the
rise in dispersion within groups. More sophisticated
estimates (Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman 1990; Free-
man 1992; Card 1992; DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux
1994) give comparable results. Bell and Pitt (1995)
have reported a similar finding for the United King-
dora. The uniformity of the estimates is impressive: It
is rare in economics for different techniques applied
by different analysts ha different countries to come up
with approximately the same estimate.
The 20 percent estimate is, however, almost cer-
tainly an underestimate of the true effect of declining
union density on inequality. It is, after all, based on a
A rough estimate is that about
20 percent of the rise in
within-group inequality of pay
can be attributed to the drop
in unionization in the
U.S. private sector.
simple counterfactual--that the decline of unioniza-
tion affects inequality only by reducing the share of
the less dispersed or higher-paid blue-collar work
force in employment. But it is higlily likely that such a
decline has "spillover" effects to other workers as
well. Consider how the U.S. job market might operate
if the percentage of private sector workers covered
were two or three or four times the 1995 level of 10.5
percent. With private sector union density of 20 per-
cent (the level in the mid-1970s), or 30 percent (early
1960s), or 40 percent (mid-1950s), I would expect
union wage agreelnents that reduce dispersion to spill
over to nonunion firms. In the 1950s and 1960s, many
nonunion firms paid union rates or introduced union-
style pay structures in order to remain nonunion. The
smaller dispersion in pay within union workplaces
would thus be extended to nonunion workplaces, at
least to some extent. The hard question is to obtain a
valid and robust estimate of how big that "to some
extent" would be now.
One way to measure the possible "full" effect of
labor market institutions on pay inequality is to com-
pare collective bargaining coverage/unionization and
measures of inequality across countries, using a re-
gression analysis. Given estimates of the effect of labor
market institutions on inequality, one can--bravely
--use the coefficients to infer how much lower U.S.
earnings inequality might be if we had higher levels
of collective bargaining coverage. Since many things
differ between countries, and collective bargaining
coverage means something different in different set-
tings, such an analysis will be at best indicative. Still,
for the purpose of gauging the possible effects of labor
market institutions on economy-wide earnings distri-
butions, a cross-country exercise will at least be pro-
vocative. If one believes that entire economies are the
right units of observation, there is not much else one
can do in any case to get the "full impact" of labor
market institutions.
Table 2 gives levels of collective bargaining cov-
erage and union densities6 and the two measures of
inequality from Figure 1. There is a positive relation-
ship between coverage and the nearness of the 10th
decile to the median, and between coverage and the
ratio of the earnings of the 90th to 10th deciles, but
there are also clear divergencies: Japan has the second
lowest collective bargaining coverage, but a "Europe-
an" distribution of low pay; Sweden has less inequal-
ity than Germany, which has higher coverage, and
so on. There is also a relationship between the two
measures of inequality and unionization. The regres-
sions at the bottom of the table summarize these
patterns: They show that collective bargaining cover-
age is more closely linked to the level of inequality
than is unionization per se.
The regressions provide one indicator of the po-
tential effect of differences in national coverage and
union density on differences in inequality. Consider,
for example, the difference in inequality between the
United States and Germany. In the early 1990s, collec-
6 The reader will note that in Japan collective coverage is
slightly below the unionization rate. One possible explanation for
this is that it reflects the crudeness of the data. But it could also be
a real phenomenon, as some unions may have membership that is
not large enough to produce collective contracts.
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Collective Bargaining Coverage,
Unionization, and Earnings Inequality,
by Country
Earnings Ratio
Country Coverage Unionization 90/10 10/50
United States .18 .16 5.65 .37
Japan .23 .25 2.74 .61
Canada .38 .36 4.00 .42
United Kingdom .47 .39 3.05 .62
Netherlands .71 .26 2.15 .76
Norway .75 .56 2.16 .69
Portugal .79 .32 2.57 .70
Australia .80 .40 2.15 .71
Sweden .83 .83 1.96 .76
Germany .90 .33 2.30 .71
Belgium .90 .51 2.39 .73
Austria .98 .46 2.70 .61
Summar~ Regressions (standard error in parentheses)
90/10 differential = 4.95 -2,03 coverage -1.89 union
(.85)        (1.23)
10/50 differential = .39 +.29 coverage +.13 union
(.to)        (.15)
Source: OECD 1993; 1994.
R2 = .55
R2 = .55
tive bargaining coverage was 0.18 compared to 0.90,
and unionization was 0.16 versus 0.33. Taking the
regression coefficients from the equations, I estimate
that much of the U.S.-German difference in inequality
is due to differences in pay-setting institutions. The
U.S.-German difference in the 90th/10th decile of
earnings is 3.35 points; the regression suggests that
1.79 points of this difference is due to the differences in
coverage and unionization--a bit over one-half. Sim-
ilarly, the U.S.-German difference in the 10th decile/
median of earnings is 0.34; the regression suggests that
0.23 points of the observed difference between the
countries is due to differences in collective bargaining
coverage and unionization--about two-thirds. While
these data are limited to one period7 and do not cover
all the OECD countries, they are consistent with the
notion that a significant portion of the U.S.-European
gap in inequality is associated ~vith differences in
wage-setting institutions. On the other hand, the re-
gression does not account for the U.S.-Japanese differ-
ence in inequality. Whether this is because the cover-
age variable incorrectly specifies Japanese institutions
7 I carmot readily analyze earlier periods because tlie source for
collective bargaining coverage, the OECD Employment Outlook for
1994, does not provide figures for earlier periods.
(nearly all Japanese firms raise pay by nearly the same
percentage amounts, after the Shunto Offensive) or for
other reasons I am not prepared to say.
But the issue of concern is whether declines in
collective bargaining coverage are associated with
rising inequality. Table 3 summarizes the limited
available data in terms of the change in coverage and
the absolute and percentage increases in the 90th/10th
decile earnings ratios. The countries with the largest
declines in density of collective bargaining coverage
had the largest increases in inequality in absolute and
percentage terms; countries with modest declines had
modest changes in inequality; while those with little
change or an increase averaged even smaller growth
in inequality. But the country variation in these
groups is substantial: The U.S.-Canada comparison
shows that Canada had as substantial a percentage
increase in inequality as the United States, with essen-
tially no change in density, whereas the decline in
density in the United Kingdom is associated with a
large increase in inequality. The overall pattern is in
the expected direction, but here we clearly need more
data over more time periods, and perhaps a more
careful look at the U.S. and Canadian contrast. Card
and Freeman (1993) and ensuing work suggest that
Canada did not have as large an increase in inequality
as the United States, contrary to the picture given by
the OECD figures on which my table relies.
These diverse calculations show that while the
U.S. might or might not have a more effective econ-
omy if union density were higher, it would surely be
a less unequal society.
Claim 3: Government Interventions
Affect Inequality
The United States govermnent might have inter-
vened in the labor market in various ways to lean
against the winds of inequality in the 1980s and 1990s.
It could have directly intervened in wage-setting,
through increases in the minhnum wage. It could have
provided greater support for job training or higher
education. It could have offered public sector employ-
ment or wage subsidies to employers for lower-paid
employees. Going beyond the labor market, the gov-
er~m~ent could have acted to offset the effects of rising
labor market inequality on disposable incomes by
redistributive tax and transfer policies. Note, however,
that cuts in the income tax for the low-paid or in-
creases in the earned income tax credit might poten-
tially raise before-tax inequality (assuming that they
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Changes in Collective Bargaining Coverage and in
Measures o~ h~equality, 1980s~
Change in Change in
Coverage 90/10 Ratio






United Kingdom - 23 .95 40 -. 10 - 14
Australia -8 .27 14 - .04 -5
United States -8 .92 15 -.03 -7
Countries with Modest
Drops in Coverage
Japan -5 .25 10 -.02 -3
Netherlands - 5 .05 2 -.04 - 5




- 1        -.08       -4        .04         6
1 .50 14 - .04 - 10
~The years covered are 1979 to 1991 or to the latest year available (U.S. to 1989, Canada 1981
through 1990). See OECD (1993, Table 5.2).
have an incidence similar to payroll taxes), requiring
us to look as well at after-tax earnings patterns, h~ any
case, the range of possibilities is substantial, and
beyond the scope of this study. I consider the one that
has recently attracted considerable attention: the min-
imum wage.
Studies have estimated the effect of maintaining
the real value of the minimtun wage on the distribu-
tion of earnings, usually under the assumption that
such a change in policy would have little or no effect
on employment. As estimates of the effect of higher
minima on employment invariably yield modest elas-
ticities-the most reliable "large" elasticity is -0.24
(Neumark and Wascher 1995)--this is a tenable initial
assumption. For men aged 25 to 64, few of whom are
paid the minimum, Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman
(1990) simulated that maintaining a minimum wage at
its 1979 real level throughout the 1980s would have
had only a modest effect on the earnings of less skilled
workers, but these estimates appear to be overly
conservative. Using a more sophisticated simulation
methodology, DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1994)
estimate that failure to maintain the minimum wage at
its 1979 real value accounts for 10 percent of the
increase h~ the standard deviation of adult male wages
over the period and for 30 percent of the increase
among adult women workers. Card and Kreuger
(1995) compare earnings inequality and the propor-
tion of workers covered by rabbi-
mum wages across states and come
up with a 30 percent estimate of the
contribution of the decreased real
minimum to the inequality among
all workers. Mishel and Bernstein
(1994) come up with the biggest
estimates. Their simulations sug-
gest that had the minhnum wage
been maintained at its 1979 real
value, the growth of the 90/10
earnings differential inequality
among adult men would have been
some 50 percent lower in 1993 than
it actually was, and the growth of
the differential among women
would have been two-thirds lower.
Without endorsing any of these fig-
ures, this line of research can be
seen as showing that maintaining
the minimum wage at historically
plausible levels relative to the av-
erage would have helped limit the
near free-fall in wages at the bot-
tom of the earnings distribution that characterized the
U.S. job market in this period.
A second possible set of government activities is
on the quantity side of the market. Inequality in pay is
less evident in the public sector than in the private
sector. As noted, Katz and Krueger (1991) show that
inequality was lower and increased less in the 1980s in
the public sector than in the private sector. But the
change in public sector employment was modest and
between 1980 and 1993 the public sector share of
nonagrictiltural employment fell from 18 percent to
17 percent, so that this change could not have contrib-
uted much to the change in overall inequality. Still, a
more active government policy that used the public
sector to hire low-skill workers directly or to subsidize
the employment of low-paid workers, say through
reductions in payroll taxes, might have reduced in-
equality. Such policies would raise the employment
of the low-skilled, but not necessarily their pay, in the
short run; but over time, earnings consequences
would follow as the low-paid would accrue greater
job experience, the number of jobless would decline,
and so forth. I have not estimated the possible impact
of such a program on the earnings of the low-paid and
on inequality, nor whether its benefits would exceed
its costs. My suspicion is that a reasonably sized,
targeted employment program would have at least
modest effects on inequality.
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Assume that you accept the evidence and argu-
mentation in this paper that you calmot tell the
economic history of the rise in inequality and fall ha
real earnings in the United States in the latter decades
of the twentieth century without bringing labor mar-
ket institutions into the story. Does this mean you
should run out and demand that your favorite politi-
cal candidate copy FDR and declare "As President, I
want workers to join unions?" (Do it, guys --it may
not be popular but it’s right!) Or that you should risk
your job by trying to organize your fellow employees
into a union? Or try to organize your fellow employers
into a European-style employers’ federation?
Not necessarily. The causes and cures of problems
are not necessarily linked. We cure myopia (a largely
genetic disease) with glasses and contact lenses. We
develop new genetic strains of animals or plants to
deal with environmental diseases or rusts that
threaten those anhnals or plants. Similarly, the best
cure to the problem of falling real earnings and rising
inequality may be unrelated to the factors that caused
the problem. If you believe that trade is the cause of
rising inequality, you can still reject protectionism, on
the grounds that the potentially large costs to trade
barriers outweigh any benefits in the form of reduced
inequality. Or, if you believe that technology has
impoverished low-skill workers, I suggest you do not
trash your computer or march on M.I.T. The costs of
stopping the advance of technology (were it possible)
far outweigh any benefits in the form of reduced
inequality.
You can logically look instead in other directions
for cures. Maybe the most efficacious solution to rising
inequality is a more progressive tax and transfer
system or greater expenditures on public goods,
which the poor consume equally with the rich. Or
maybe it is providing laptops for every poor child, so
that they become more adept at dealing with modern
teclmology.
In the case at hand, I believe that institutional
interventions in pay-setting have potential costs, some
substantial. These costs have exercised Europeans for
some time. Europe has not had much job growth.
OECD-Europe has lower employment/population
rates than the United States. OECD-Europe has long
spells of joblessness. I am not convinced that the
"right" institutional pay-setting necessarily lowers
employment by enough to worry about in a country
whose problem is not job creation but earnings in-
equality. The workers whose pay has fallen in the
United States have also experienced loss of time
worked, and the minimum wage studies suggest that
elasticities of demand for the low-skilled are small.
Still, I would not dismiss the potential cost of labor
market institutions in employment.
At the same time, labor market institutions bring
benefits beyond lower inequality--the voice benefits
of democracy in workplaces--that must be factored
into any overall assessment of those institutions. A
society in which bosses boss and workers obey--
where workers have no independent say in the deci-
sions that affect their working lives ("if you don’t like
the way the company does it, leave")--is likely to miss
out in efficiency (see Freeman and Lazear 1995) as well
as in fairness and decent treatment of all. An assess-
ment of any scheme to rebuild American labor insti-
tutions must take account of the full spectrum of costs
and benefits of those institutions.
The message of this paper is not that the best or
only cure to inequality and impoverishment of work-
ers is increased institutional wage-setting. For what it
is worth (full disclosure of biases and all that) I believe
that greater reliance on labor institutions is a plausible
cure to rising inequality and is probably a necessary
part of any solution. But this is belief, not evidence.
The message of the paper is that institutions are
important in distributing earnings, and that institu-
tional developments in the United States in the past
several decades have contributed to our earnings
problem. To ignore the role of unions and government
policies is to ignore part of the real world --not a wise
strategy for understanding what happens in the econ-
omy nor for devising policy solutions to improve
outcomes. Rising inequality is too serious a national
problem for us to exclude from discourse any set of
potential candidates for cause or cures.
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I
n this paper Richard Freeman has put the best case
forward for the importance of labor market insti-
tutions in explaining the level and trend in earn-
ings inequality. Motivated by his broad reading of
the literature and unhindered by any fear of going
too far out on a limb, Freeman offers us what is
probably an upper bound on the importance of labor
market institutions. Many will wince at his willing-
ness to draw broad conclusions from bivariate rela-
tionships. However, as is usually the case, many of his
observations show real insight.
I view my role as the sympathetic yet cautious
observer ~vho enjoys seeing the daring of others, while
at the same time wanting to bring a mild dose of
caution to this endeavor. My hope is that my more
restrained case for the importance of labor market
institutions will strike the proper balance.
Do institutions matter? The answer is obviously
"Yes." One sin~ply cannot believe that market forces
have been so consistently different in the Nordic and
Northern European countries than in the United States
and the United Kingdom as to generate such wide
and persistent differences in earnings inequality. So
the question is not whether institutions matter, but
how much they matter. This raises the question, "How
much compared to what?" If there is going to be a
horse race, one needs to have at least one other horse
on the track. The most obvious competition is between
the importance of market forces and that of institu-
tional forces.
Conceptual Issues
Before moving to the empirical evidence, let me
raise three conceptual issues. The first focuses on the
difference between explanations for changes in earn-
ings inequality that focus on levels and on changes in
institutions. Conceptually, nothing is wrong with
thinking that both levels and changes may matter.
Institutional constraints may provide an imperfect
screen limiting changes in the wage distribution. The
tighter the screen, the slower the growth in inequality.
Therefore, levels may matter. Likewise, tightening the
screen may reduce the growth in inequality. There-
fore, changes in institutions may matter.
While nothing is conceptually wrong with using
both the level and the change in institutions to explain
trends in inequality, this gives the institutional expla-
nations a great deal of latitude. If a country has tightly
regulated labor markets which are then weakened
(as was the case in many countries during the 1980s),
then one can explain either increases or decreases in
inequality. If inequality did not rise, it was because of
the level of institutional constraints. If inequality rose,
it was because of the changes in constraints.
The pattern of large increases in
inequality in countries zoith the
more decentralized labor markets
forms the core of the argument for
the importance of institutions.
This degree of latitude, of course, can be limited
by imposing some structure on the data. In principle,
nothing stops us from including more than one ex-
planatory variable h~ a regression with changes in
inequality as the dependent variable. But this raises
the second issue. Any cross-national comparison is
limited by the very small number of countries. Most
studies compare just two or three countries. Ten
countries is a large sample. To ask these data to
distinguish between the effects of levels and trends in
institutions while holding other relevant factors con-
stant (changes in relative supply, change in interna-
tional trade, and the like) is asking a lot.
The tlzird conceptual issue is that a full ans~ver to
the question of the relative importance of institutional
and market forces would have to take account of
feedback between the two. Inasmuch as institutional
changes are caused by changes in market forces, one
would need to allocate this endogenous change to
market forces, not to changes in institutions. The most
obvious example is the decline in unionization, which
was certainly caused in part by increased foreign
competition that weakened the bargaining power of
workers. But causation does not go only from markets
to institutions. For example, the downsizing of gov-
eriunent, which is clearly an institutional change,
results in a change in relative demand for skilled
~vorkers as long as the public and private sectors differ
in skill intensity. I mention this endogeneity problem
not because it is solvable at this stage, but only to
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in. As a practical matter, my guess is that endogeneity
is small potatoes compared to the other empirical
problems.
Empirical Evidence
With these preliminaries out of the way, let me
turn to the empirical evidence presented in Freeman’s
paper. The first claim is that institutional differences
explain much of the differences in levels and trends in
inequality. I will focus my comments on changes in
inequality over time, since this is what has preoccu-
pied the profession recently and because I have little
doubt about the importance of institutional differences
in explaining levels of inequality. (Differences in mar-
ket forces could not be large enough to explain the
substantial cross-national differences in the levels of
inequality that have persisted over decades.)
The strongest case for the importance of institu-
tions comes from the simple correlation between al-
most any ranking of countries by the degree of cen-
tralization of wage setting and by increases in
earnings inequality. Finland, Sweden, and the Neth-
erlands experienced small increases in inequality, fol-
lowed closely by Israel and France. These are all
countries tliat have either strong union coverage or
other forms of centralized wage setting. The sole
exception is France, Which has fairly decentralized
labor markets but has a widely applied and rising real
minimum wage. At the other extreme are the United
States and the United Kingdom, which experienced
large increases in inequality and have very decentral-
ized labor markets. This pattern of large increases in
inequality in countries with the more decentralized
labor markets forms the core of the argument for the
importance of institutions.
It is, however, instructive to go behind these
aggregate measures of h~equality and to look at
changes in inequality between and within groups. The
large increase in overall inequality in the United States
and the United Kingdom reflected increases in the
education premium, increases in the experience pre-
mium, and increases in inequality within groups. The
pattern is not nearly as uniform for countries that
experienced little or no increase in inequality. The
small changes in inequality in Sweden and Finland
reflect a decline in the age premium matched by an
increase in the education premium. In the Nether-
lands, the pattern is just the opposite, with the age
premium rising but the education premium falling.
So the first question to ask is whether market-based
or institutional-based explanations fit these within-
country differences better.
Two additional sources of information can help
inform the debate. If changes in relative supplies of
factors are consistent with changes in relative wages
between education or experience groups, then tliis is
clearly consistent with a market-based explanation.
On the other hand, if institutional rigidities kept
wages from falling to market-clearing levels, then one
should observe a change in the relative employment
rates of the least skilled.1 My claim is not that changes
in relative supplies or changes in relative unemploy-
ment rates provide conclusive evidence for market-
based or institutional explanations, but rather that
they provide additional evidence which helps get us
beyond the simple cross-country correlations between
changes in overall inequality and levels of institutional
barriers.
France and Sweden provide the strongest case for
the importance of institutional constraints.2 In France,
the minimum wage (the SMIC) increased faster than
the average wage during the first half of the 1980s,
then slowed later in the decade. These changes in the
minimum wage closely parallel the relative stability
of inequality tltrough the mid-1980s followed by a
mild increase in inequality during the late 1980s and
early 1990s. If the minimum wage was a binding
constraint, then we should observe an increase in the
relative unemployment rates of the young and less-
educated workers. This is exactly what we observe.
Likewise, the patterns of changes in relative un-
employment rates are consistent with an institutional
explanation for the change in inequality between
experience groups in Sweden. During the 1980s, the
earnhags of young workers actually rose faster than
the earnings of older workers. This was mirrored by
an increase in the relative unemployment rates of
young workers in Sweden, strongly suggesting that
institutional constraints were propping up the wages
of the young while demand for their skills was falling.
The Netherlands and Finland also have institu-
tions that potentially could have limited the rise in
inequality. The evidence on changes in relative supply
and unemployment rates suggests, however, that
these constraints were not binding. Recall that in the
Netherlands, the small increase in overall inequality
~ Unemployment would not rise if demand were totally inelas-
tic, an assumption that Freeman rejects implicitly when he writes
about the cost of institutional interventions in pay setting as taking
the form of lower employment/population rates.
2 Change in returns to skills, relative supplies, and relative
unemployment rates are from Gottschalk and Joyce (1995).
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education premium dropped considerably, while the
age premium increased. The drop in the education
premium does not seem to be the result of institutional
constraints on wages of the least educated. Rather, a
substantial increase occurred in the relative supply of
college-educated workers in the Netherlands during
the 1980s. This market-driven force offset the increase
in demand for educated workers, with the result that
wages of college-educated workers actually fell rela-
tive to wages of less-educated workers. The impor-
tance of institutional factors is fnrther undermined by
the fact that the relative unemployment rates of less-
skilled workers did not increase.
The only policy that I would add
to Freeman’s list is changes in the
earned income tax credit. This
seems to be a straightforward way
of dealing with changes in the
earnings distribution.
The pattern in Finland is similarly consistent with
a market-driven explanation. Here, the small overall
increase in inequality reflects an increase in the edu-
cation premium countered by a decline in the age
premium. But the increase in the relative wages of
younger workers is consistent with a market explana-
tion, since the relative supply of younger workers also
decreased in Finland. Furthermore, changes in relative
unemployment rates again do not point to binding
constraints on wages of young workers, even in this
country with centralized labor market institutions.
In summary, the raw correlation between the
level of institutionalized wage settings and changes in
earnings inequality gives an incomplete picture. In
essence, it shows only one horse in the race. When we
look behind these numbers at changes in relative
supplies, we find that roughly half of the countries
~vith centralized wage-setting institutions also experi-
enced changes in relative supplies that are consistent
with the data. In essence, the raw correlations tell us
only about the potential for binding constraints, not
whether these constraints were binding. It should
come as no surprise that in some countries constraints
were binding, while in other countries they were not.
The second claim in Freeman’s paper is that
declining unionism was a big cause of the rise in
inequality. He provides two types of evidence. The
first is a summary of studies of the United States that
have tried to estimate the impact of changes in union-
ism on inequality. As he points out, all but one of these
studies come to similar conclusions. Roughly 20 per-
cent of the increase in inequality came from the
decline in unionization. I have no quibble with this
body of research, other than to point out that changes
in unionization may have partially reflected changes
in market forces. But as a purely accounting statement,
the number 20 percent seems reasonable. Whether 20
percent is large or small is clearly in the eye of the
beholder. One can make equally strong statements
about the importance of foreign trade, computeriza-
tion, or other factors that explain part, but by no
means all, of the change in inequality.
The second body of evidence provided by Free-
man (his Table 3) uses cross-national comparisons to
try to tease out the importance of declines in union-
ization. This is one of those cases where his creative
imagination may have taken him a bit too far. While
the correlation between changes in inequality and
overall measures of centralization of wage setting is
fairly strong, the relationship between changes in this
specific institution and changes in inequality is far
from overwhelming. When these data are plotted, one
sees that the negative relationship is almost totally
driven by the United Kingdom. Even if one were to
draw conclusions from simple correlations like this,
one would not want to bet on the institutional horse,
based on these weak patterns. In my opinion, this
cross-national comparison does little to strengthen the
case for the importance of institutions.
The third claim is that government interventions
can affect inequality. I have no objection to this claim.
As Freeman himself points out, the causes and cures
of problems are not necessarily linked. The United
States could have done substantially more than it did
to offset the changes in the labor market, even if
changes in institutions were not an important cause
for the increase in inequality.
The only policy that I would add to Freeman’s list
is changes in the earned income tax credit. In 1993, a
low-income worker with children was eligible for a
19.5 percent tax credit on earnings. This was supposed
to be raised to 40 percent by 1996. While one can argue
about the incentive effects of the EITC and the diffi-
culty of administering a program that encourages
people to overstate their earnings, this seems to be a
very straightforward way of dealing with changes in
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changes in government policy can offset increases in
inequality, but whether the nation wants to offset the
declines in earnings of persons who, through no fatflt
of their own, were born during a century when wages
of less-skilled workers plummeted.
In summary, I come away from this paper with
the conclusion that institutions can and, at times, do
matter. What Freeman has offered us is an upper
bound on the importance of institutions. Even if one
moderates his conclusions, one is left with the impres-
sion that institutions provide binding constraints in
some countries in some periods. Furthermore, the
United States could have done a great deal more than
it has done to offset changes in labor markets.
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" ~vill begin with two general comments and then
summarize the possible policy implications that
.flow from today’s papers.
Defining the Problem
To my mind, an important issue remains that we
have not discussed, and should: the fact that we are all
here because we agree that existing inequalities are too
great. We have not really demonstrated that such
inequalities are so terrible, however, and we need to
lay out the welfare function explicitly. It is not clear
that the current Congress has the same welfare func-
tion in mind as the one that seems to prevail here.
The biggest divisions about what is the right
amount of inequality can be described as follows. One
way of thinking would support some sort of safety net
that would protect medical care, housing, and educa-
tion at a minimal level, while leaving the rest up to the
market. The other way of thinking about inequality
argues that we should allow the market to operate
sufficiently to ensure that such programs maintain an
efficient purpose in society. The United States now has
such a large group relying on our safety net precisely
because we have not done so, according to this point
of view. Some statement about the actual level and
reasons for concern about earnings inequality should
accompany any policy discussion.
My second general comment relates to the deci-
sion, in this conference, to focus on both spatial and
labor market contributions to earnings inequality.
Spatial inequality analysis usually emphasizes the
group with the lowest level of income, the bottom
decile, the underclass. We have concentrations of the
poor, and growing disparities between the city and
the suburbs in income and many related socioeco-
nomic measures. Policies derived from spatial in-
equality studies emphasize improved mobility of res-
idential location, and improved ability of people
living in one place to get to employment in another.
Such policies assume that if the poor were more
dispersed, we would have fewer problems.
Labor market inequality analysis, on the other
hand, looks at the whole range of the income distri-
bution. A researcher may compare the lowest income
group to the highest, or measure the difference be-
tween the second and the eighth deciles. Such studies
are interested in ho~v the market rewards skills in
relation to productivity, and in wage determination as
it is related to the demand for and supply of labor. The
focus on the lowest income group, in some labor
market studies, overlaps the similar focus of most
studies of spatial distribution. The policies flowing
from these studies are directed to education, training,
the minimum wage, and the role of internal private
sector management.
Mobility and Neighborhoods
The spatial papers--the overview paper by
Mayer, and the papers by O’Regan and Quigley, and
Holzer and Ihlanfeldt--point strongly and clearly to
both the role of transportation and the role of neigh-
borhood effects in the spatial reinforcement of earn-
ings inequality. Such papers provoke much discussion
and interest here, because we operate at the margin in
determining which is more important: neighborhood
effects or transportation effects. As empirical social
scientists, however, we must understand the tension
that exists between the partial equilibrium or individ-
ual questions that drive our research and the general
equilibrium reality in which both transportation and
neighborhood play an important role.
Over the past quarter century, one of the great
flaws in public policy has been to use single-pronged
policy programs to aid those at the lowest end of the
income distribution, rather than to use the more
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search have helped to drive that misguided policy
approach. We identify one or another input as a
significant coefficient in our regressions and tend to
design policies accordingly. Much of the current
thinking in research circles and in the experimentation
fnnded by large foundations has shifted to ways to
assist low-income families by addressing many areas
simultaneously. While specific research projects may
point to one approach, effective results will reqttire
combining the knowledge from all our research efforts
into a comprehensive policy program.





The research results on transportation and neigh-
borhood effects discussed today combine in the fol-
lowing questions: Can an individual freely choose
where to live, given the income constraints? Does
every geographic area provide a supply of residential
locations for whoever wants to live there? And can
people get to the places where the jobs are located?
The papers presented today said that mobility mat-
ters and that neighborhoods do have effects on earn-
ings.
So what are the policies to think about? In our
policy discussions, we must take into account the
devolution of pouter that is taking place in this coun-
try. How much, and in what form, we may not know
yet, but some devolution surely will take place. One
tool to implement devolution is block grants to state
and local governments. Although block grants have
received much support, little attention is being paid
to just how they will be distributed--not even by big
city mayors, who will certainly be among those most
affected. This is clearly a case where it is all in the
details! There is a well-known example from the 1970s
of the need to understand the details. The formula for
the distribution of Community Development Block
Grants used the log of the unemployment rate to
calculate funding. How could big city mayors have
allowed the log to get in, rather than the level? The
question is whether states, with their increased power,
will regard spatial and labor market inequalities as a
major concern. And the question is also whether the
federal government will use the block grant formulas
to give incentives for them to do so.
How much will be spent on increasing mobility
by tailoring transportation to provide access to jobs?
Will there be constant legal pressure for the availabil-
ity of housing for all who can pay? Much of the
current inm~obility comes from a certain fixity, or even
expansion, in the size of the underclass, the poorest
group. We have not been successful in breaking
through that fixity, and it is not clear that transporta-
tion will change it, either. Marginal effects are impor-
tant, so we should ensure that transportation is avail-
able, but we should think about them as marginal
effects.
When thinking about neighborhood effects, it is
important to focus on the dispersion of poverty. No
systematic study has been done on what happens to
income inequality if neighborhoods are changed by a
reduction in the spatial concentration of poverty. In
New Jersey, for example, the latest Mt. Laurel decision
was interpreted to mean suburbs could "pay" or
"play"--either contribute financially or build low-
income housing--and all opted to pay. If the decision
had been to put low-income housing in many of these
suburbs, rather than sharing only fiscally, this would
have been a good case study for the effect of disper-
sion policies. That is the only such court decision I
know of that has gone so far in trying to alter the
poverty concentration--and legal scholars differ as
to whether that decision will, in fact, have wide
implications.
A few years ago, I organized a conference that
took place in that great urban setting, Bellagio on Lake
Como, comparing urban economic development in
Western Europe and the United States. A major con-
clusion emerging from the comparison was that Euro-
pean cities are healthier than U.S. cities for two
reasons. First, the poor are much more dispersed in
Europe than in the United States; lower-income fam-
ilies tend to live around the periphery of major cities,
not in the center, as in the United States. Second, most
European cities receive centralized funding. Their
state of well-being is nowhere near as dependent on
the local tax base as that of cities in the United States.
So, I encourage thh~king about deconcent~ation policies.
The Kain-Singleton paper suggests that spatial
inequality translates into fewer resources going to
schools in poor and minority communities than to
schools in more affluent areas. We still do not know
whether these resources matter. If they do, we need
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resources that in fact have an irnpact on education. If
resources do not matter, then we are left thinking
about policies that do not necessarily involve re-
sources but, rather, involve a major restructuring of
the organization and incentives of our educational
system.
Labor Market Issues
What are the real labor market issues in connec-
tion with earnings inequality for those at this confer-
ence? If they are not primarily issues about those at
the bottom, then what is there to worry about? We
might worry about those unemployed who have a
temporary skills mismatch for labor market needs,
who need help with mobility or retraining. We might
worry about today’s middle class that has less income
Immigration policy has strong
spatial implications, as well
as general implications
for the labor force as a whole.
In the past decade, most
of the new immigrants
ended up concentrated
in the central cities.
ferent roles. I do not see any significant public policies
about income inequality arising from the activities of
internal management, although the notion of an inde-
pendent role for internal management in lessening
earnings inequality is quite interesting--profit-driven
training programs and educational standards for hir-
ing, for example.
Richard Freeman’s policy recommendations were
based on a reexamination of a number of institutions
that affect earnings. I agree with Peter Gottschalk that
such institutions are largely endogenous. They obvi-
ously have been supported by laws, but on the whole,
they emerged from our society endogenously rather
than exogenously.
So to address inequality in the general distribu-
tion of earnings and income, the list of non-spatial
public policies would include changing tax policies,
raising the minimum wage, improving training and
higher education opportunities for low-income indi-
viduals, and changing immigration policy. Immigra-
tion policy, of course, has strong spatial implications,
as well as general implications for the U.S. labor force
as a whole. Five metropolitan areas in the United
States received 58 percent of all new immigrants in the
past decade, with Los Angeles accounting for 24
percent. Most of the new immigrants ended up con-
centrated in the central cities. Although immigration
policy is set nationally, the effects are concentrated in
a limited number of metropolitan areas. In the central
cities of those areas, the fiscal impact of that concen-
tration affects the local governments’ abilities to pro-
vide services to those at the bottom of the income
distribution.
than its predecessors. To my mind, this does not seem
to be such a worrisome thing to contemplate. We
might worry about international competitiveness, in
which case we want to ensure that international
markets are freed up, leaving it to the market to
translate those changes into the labor market. It is the
group at the bottom, however, that warrants most of
the attention from public policies--a view that prob-
ably reflects the social welfare function of the partici-
pants in this conference.
Peter Cappelli and Richard Freeman see some
possible solutions in the private sector. Cappelli ar-
gues that managers influence the wage structure; but
if you believe in markets, then presumably they man-
age the wage structure so as to maximize profits. It is
difficult to think of managers of private companies as
the guardians of more equality; they have quite dif-
Cities Are Special
As we look ahead, new policy options will
emerge as power devolves from the federal govern-
ment, largely in the form of block grants to states.
These grants offer a new opportunity to build in
incentives that would encourage state and local gov-
ernments to reduce the inequality of income by reduc-
ing the spatial concentration of poverty. We do not
know now how policymakers will choose to structure
these block grants, but they certainly open up the
possibility of establishing incentives to change the
spatial distribution of the poor within a state, to
change the minimum wage, and to alter tax policy. It
is a big challenge to our current thinking to focus our
concerns about income inequality on the roles of state
and local governments. In the past, based on very
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cies were activated on the federal level. Now, we will
have 50 political arenas to consider. This certainly
suggests that spatial inequality will not be addressed
in a uniform way, and that we will have to concern
ourselves, increasingly, with the effects of competition
among the states in welfare reform--who will spend
the least?
This should leave us worried about one of Amer-
ica’s greatest problems--our large old cities, where
the biggest inequalities of income are found. Within
the states with these large cities, the vote counts of the
suburbanites plus the rural areas exceed the vote of
the cities. That is not grounds for optimism about the
likelihood of reducing income inequality in the United
States!
dren. These were also the groups who experienced
declining incomes.
Panelist Ann B. Schnare
Vice President for Housing Economics,
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
I was asked to address the hnpact the mortgage
market may be having on income inequality. I find
that a difficult hypothesis to address and have decided
to turn it around a bit. I will discuss the impact that
income trends are having on the housing market and
the pressures they are putting on the mortgage indus-
try as well as on the housing programs that serve the
poor, such as those run by the Depart3nent of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD).
Let me begin with a few words on how the effects
of earnings inequality have played out in the housing
market historically. Enormous and rapid improve-
ments occurred in the homeownership rate after
World War II. We went from a nation of renters to a
nation of owners. But in the early 1970s, homeowner-
ship rates began to decline and continued to do so
until last year. Many feared that the American Dream
of homeownership was being threatened.
If you look at the numbers, much of the decline in
the homeownership rate can be explained by demo-
graphic trends, for example, the rise of single-person
households. But more important, in my view, are the
income trends we have examined today. Younger,
middle-class households between 25 and 35 years old,
the classic first-time homebuyers, have experienced
stagnating or even declining wages. Homeownership
rose among younger households without children,
both singles and married couples, but it fell signifi-
cantly for both single and married parents with chil-
Poverty in the Cities
The middle class certainly has been affected, as
the stagnation in wages put pressure on homeowner-
ship rates, but the big impact has been on the rental
market, as both relative and real incomes fell for those
at the bottom of the income distribution, the people
who traditionally have been renters. As a result, there
is a large and growing gap between what it costs to
operate an apartment building and the rents house-
holds can afford to pay. This has led to two problems,
Not only are individuals pulling
apart, so are neighborhoods
and communities. Increasingly,
the poor are concentrated in
highly impacted neighborhoods
within the city.
the physical decay we see in urban areas and an
increased demand for government subsidies. And
HUD has been severely hit by reductions in the
resources put into low-income programs, a trend that
will only intensify in the future, in my opinion.
These are individual effects, in a way. But the
papers we discussed earlier make clear that not only
are individuals pulling apart, so are neighborhoods
and communities. Increasingly, the poor are concen-
trated in highly impacted neighborhoods within the
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These changes are having a growing impact in turn on
the fiscal health of cities and their ability to pay
for essential services. And city fiscal difficulties may
in turn intensify some of the negative neighborhood
effects that we have discussed today. The problems of
urban areas are now linked intrinsically to problems
of income distribution. To what extent they are con-
tributing to or causing such problems is a matter for
debate, but income distribution problems certainly are
affecting the future viability of urban areas.
Implications for the Mortgage Industry
What does this mean for the mortgage industry?
Certainly there is a lot of concern about the ability of
low- and moderate-income households, especially mi-
norities, to get access to the mortgage market. Follow-
ing the Boston Fed study, as well as other work on
mortgage flows in low-income and minority neighbor-
hoods, the response by the mortgage industry has
been fairly dramatic as we reexamined our underwrit-
ing criteria to see if we had unnecessary barriers to
getting credit to inner-city neighborhoods.
This reexamination has led to a lot of experimen-
tation, which has intensified in recent years. Unfortu-
nately, the initial results are not very comforting. The
mortgage industry has seen a real decline in credit
quality, due in part to a drop-off in loan origination
volumes. Mortgage originators were staffed up, and
then they saw the refinancing market go away. Thus,
there has been increasing economic pressure to pre-
serve volume as well as political pressure.
At Freddie Mac we have found it important to
distinguish between the performance of special pro-
grams and that of mainstream programs as they relate
to the income of the borrower. In our special programs
designed to lift certain underwriting guidelines, the
record is not very good. These programs are relatively
ne~v, but as the data begin to come in, they are
showing significantly higher default and foreclosure
rates. These are low-equity loans, where only 2 per-
cent of the money comes from the borrower’s equity,
and often even this is paid by or borrowed from the
bank. Other aspects of risk are typically involved as
well; in fact, layering of risk appears to be a significant
problem. In my opinion, it is bad public policy to
put individuals into houses they cannot afford to
support. Some of the biggest abuses of government
programs occurred in FHA during the early 1970s,
when neighborhoods were blown away by bad under-
writing.
If one examines mainstream programs, in partic-
ular the relationship between loan performance, bor-
rower income, and neighborhood income, some inter-
esting results appear that we do not fully understand
yet but that relate to spatial effects. We have found, for
example, that low-income loans perform the same
way as high-income loans, with not much difference
between the two groups. The important factor seems
to be, rather, neighborhood income, which may mean
that neighborhood income is picking up something
more fundamental about permanent income than is
revealed by examining only the current income of the
borrower.
In looking at Freddie Mac’s own mortgage pur-
chases, we have found again that credit quality is not
related to the borrower’s income but rather to neigh-
borhood income. This gets at the fact that serving
distressed inner-city neighborhoods does involve
more risk, that these are very difficult loans to do. The
lending industry has much to learn. It is doing a lot
of experimentation but concern remains about how far
to go.
People versus Places
Shifting the focus now from Freddie Mac to HUD,
one issue HUD has always been unsure about is
whether it should subsidize people or places, rely on
supply-side programs or on voucher programs. HUD
has tried to serve both pt~rposes with the same set of
programs. Over time, as HUD monies dried up, they
have increasingly targeted their subsidies to the poor-
est of the poor. The problem is that they locate such
households in precisely the neighborhoods they are
trying to upgrade. While housing programs may im-
prove individuals’ bricks and mortar, public housing
has consistently reduced the quality of the neighbor-
hoods people are living in, compared to equally poor
households not involved in housing programs--a
pretty serious indictment. These findings suggest sev-
eral policy recommendations: One is to increasingly
regard vouchers and mixed-income developments as
solutions; another, more fundamental, is to break the
link between trying to provide assistance to the poor
and doing community development. Trying to do
both together simply has not worked.
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Daniel Rose Professor of Urban Economics,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
What is the effect of inequality on growth? In
particular, will growing income inequality retard
growth? The answer, I think, is mixed. In the long run,
increasing inequality may limit the national rate of
growth, for reasons I discuss below.
In the short run, I think the causality works in
exactly the opposite way. The h~equality we now see is
a by-product of enormous industrial restructuring that
began in manufacturing h~ the early 1980s and spread
to the services sector by the end of the decade. On the
one hand, this restructuring is responsible for raising
the rate of productivity growth across the economy.
On the other hand, this same restructuring has sharply
reduced the demand for semi-skilled labor, and their
falling wages have significantly increased earnings
inequality.
The inequality we see now is a
by-product of enormous industrial
restructuring that began in
manufacturing and spread
to the services sector.
The underlying problem is that labor demand can
shift much faster than labor supply. In this case, the
demand for semi-skilled labor can fall much faster
than semi-skilled labor can acquire new skills. The
issue is much bigger than minority communities in
central cities. Median earnings for 25- to 34-year-old
men with a high school diploma or a GED is now
$20,500. This is a big decline; 15 years ago, similar
men earned about $28,000 in today’s dollars. The
number is particularly significant because 40 to 45
percent of all 30-year-old men have not gone beyond
high school. A plausible connection can be made
between these wage numbers and the "angry white
males" we hear about in political argument. A lot is
at stake. We need short-run policies to address how
we can get through this period without atomizing our
society. We need longer-run policies to help us get out
of this situation.
In the short term, I would recommend that we
treat the situation as an unanticipated natural disas-
ter-like a flood or a hurricane. In response, we might
expand our safety net to ensure that, say, health care is
not linked to jobs, since the trends that are pushing
down wages also reduce fringe benefits. In addition,
we could expand or at least strengthen the earned-
income tax credit. In all of this, we must recognize that
for a large part of the population who played by the
rules, the rules have changed in the middle of the
game, leaving people in economic jeopardy when it
may be too late to alter their choices. In this regard, we
know from training studies that it is difficult for
workers to pick up new skills at the age of 35 or 40.
Special Role of Schools
As for the future, the major issue is education and
the provision of human capital; this is where the
spatial aspect of these problems comes in. Schools, in
particular our public schools, run on routines, like
most organizations. In the 1970s, the established rou-
tines were perfectly adequate because high school
graduates still could get decent jobs. The labor market
has changed quite fast since then, but it is hard to get
schools to change their routines h~ response. The highly
decentralized structure of our schooling system makes
it doubly hard. Local schools operate within their
state’s context. And states have become something of
a deregulated industry themselves, with the federal
budget playing a much smaller role in supporting
state budgets. This leaves the states in very intense
competition for jobs, putting pressure on resources.
Within states, schools are governed in fairly income-
homogeneous local districts. So the schools and com-
munities that have been hit hardest must make the
biggest adjustments. The towns where all the parents
are highly educated have fine schools to begin with,
and their taxpayers are also doing pretty well. But
poorer working-class communities that have been hit
harder by economic restructuring are also the places
that need to make the biggest changes in their schools.
As John Bishop noted, kids make decisions early
that have a kind of path-dependence in terms of which
classes or tracks they are put in. The issue of their
access to information about what is out there for them
is very hnportant. Programs such as apprenticeships
178 May/June 1996 New England Economic Reviewfor students in low-income high schools, like Project
ProTech here in Boston, change the information on
which kids are acting.
But more than that, we must keep saying that
states should be upgrading educational standards and
imposing minimum requirements, even though it may
run against their short-run interests. These standards
and measures should give parents some sense of what
their kids are learning. In a period when we need to
upgrade standards and increase the provision of hu-
man capital, providing more information externally to
the school district is crucial.
The Migration Question
I will close with one final issue, migration, that
wish had been discussed more this morning. Massa-
chusetts, for example, recently flirted with zero pop-
ulation growth. During the "Massachusetts Miracle"
of the 1980s, the wage structure got pushed much
higher than national wages because of a lack of
in-migration. The loss of manufacturing jobs here was
masked by a construction boom, then the construc-
tion boom ended. Anecdotally we hear that fewer
decent jobs remain for less-educated people, although
well-educated people have few problems. Is zero
population growth being pushed by the out-migration
of less-educated or more-educated workers? A more
general question is, to what extent is migration affect-
ing the distribution of human capital around the
states and the underlying issue of earnings inequal-
ity? I hope this issue will be discussed more in the
future.
Panelist Lazorence F. Katz
Professor of Economics, Harvard University.
The presentations at this excellent conference
have shed further light on rising inequality, one of the
truly big stories in American economic life over the
last 20 years. The enormous disparities in the fortunes
of American families in recent years have largely been
associated with labor market changes that have in-
creased overall wage inequality and shifted wage
and employment opportunities in favor of the more-
educated and more-skilled. Less-educated young men
have suffered unprecedented losses in real earnings
and are at greater risk of nonemployment than in
years past, both in absolute terms and relative to
more-skilled workers. In short, the U.S. labor market
has experienced a massive twist against "disadvan-
taged" workers--those with limited education or
skills or from impoverished families and neighbor-
hoods--that has diminished their earnings prospects
and made it more difficult for them to keep their
families out of poverty and intact.
Many analysts believe a key driving force behind
these changes has been a strong shift in relative labor
demand against the less-educated and those doing
more routinized tasks and toward more-educated
workers and those with problem-solving skills.
Changes over time in wage inequality can be thought
of as being the outcome of a footrace between tech-
nology (the demand for skills) on the one side and the
supply of educated labor on the other side. It is clear
that the technology and demand side has been win-
ning the footrace, outstripping supply and stretching
out the wage structure during most of the past two
decades. These demand shifts favoring the more-
skilled have been reinforced by changes in pay-setting
norms, increased competition in many product mar-
kets, increased immigration of less-educated workers,
and the weakening of institutions that have protected
non-college workers (for example, the decline of
unions and the erosion of the real value of the mini-
mum wage). While much debate exists concerning the
relative importance of these different underlying
causes of rising inequality and increased returns to
skill, none of the suspected factors show any apparent
signs of abatement.
The Role of Macro Policy
Strong macroeconomic performance traditionally
has been a crucial factor in improving the labor market
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ences of the long boom of the mid and late 1980s and
the current U.S. expansion suggest that sustained
economic growth by itself, unassisted by specific ini-
tiatives to deal with increased structural labor market
barriers facing the less-skilled, is unlikely to be suffi-
cient to reverse recent trends in inequality or to
overcome increased labor market barriers facing the
disadvantaged in America’s inner cities.
Market incentives for increased individual educa-
tional investments and skills upgrading can play some
role in alleviating growing inequality in the United
States. The large increase in the college wage premium
in the 1980s has been associated with an increase in
college enrollment rates from 49 percent of high
school graduates in 1980 to more than 60 percent in
the early 1990s. Evidence from U.So time series and
cross-country studies strongly suggests that rapid
expansion of the supply of more-educated workers
narrows earnings differentials and improves the labor
Rapid expansion of the supply of
more-educated workers narrows
earnings differentials and
improves the labor market
position of the less-skilled.
But the process of supply
adjustment can take many years.
market position of the less-skilled. But the process of
supply adjustment can take many years, and many
disadvantaged individuals face financial and informa-
tional barriers to pursuing further education and
training. Furthermore, the overall supply of college
graduates has not grown very rapidly in recent years,
as John Bishop showed, becanse the current baby bust
cohort is quite small. Not many 40-year-olds return to
college when the college premium expands.
These facts suggest a number of different strate-
gies. First, we could try to improve the supply side of
the labor market, as Frank Levy discussed. Obviously,
primary and secondary education is key to that,
although access to higher education is important as
well. Second, we could try to affect the demand side of
the labor market. We are not going to shut dowu the
borders to trade; that would be foolhardy. But we
could undertake some form of targeted demand poli-
cies, such as employer-side wage subsidies for eco-
nomically disadvantaged workers, based either on
people or on place. Third, government could play a
better role in trying to make work pay, through an
expanded earned income tax credit, possibly a higher
minimum wage, or even doing more with the tax
system. Fourth, we could do more to match up jobs
and people who have very little connection to the
labor market, such as welfare recipients and disadvan-
taged youth. Given that a lot of state and local
governments will be making these decisions, we
should draw lessons from the past on which ap-
proaches work best.
Choosing Policies That Work
Our 30 years of experimenting since the Great
Society with training and wage subsidies and location-
based assistance policies have given us a menu of
options from wldch government can make its current
decisions. We have had a number of negative mes-
sages, but this is probably the one area in the govern-
ment budget where we have the most random-assign-
ment evidence on which programs actually might
work. So from this menu of options, policymakers
such as state governors could make better-informed
decisions than those made in the past.
The first thing we have learned on the negative
side is that it is extremely hard to turn around the lives
of people who have become disconnected from the
mainstream educational system and dropped out of
high school. Countless programs have attempted to
help disadvantaged youth who have dropped out of
high school and, aside from the Job Corps, a very
expensive residential program, almost all have shown
very little return. On the other hand, a number of
recent demonstration projects suggest we can be more
successful by starting earlier to work to keep kids in
high school and prevent dropouts. The Quantum
Opportunities program is a good private sector exam-
ple, and the Department of Education has run a
number of very successful demonstration projects: not
traditional programs that help a 16-year-old get a
summer job and do not last very long, but rather
programs that start at age 14 or earlier and set up an
inexpensive infrastructure with extra tutoring, to-
gether with a group at school responsible for helping
kids make connections to the labor market. Some of
the best examples, like the "I Have a Dream" pro-
grams, also guarantee some financial assistance for
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stantial effects on high school dropout rates and col-
lege attendance rates, and certainly they seem like
potentially good uses of the funds that states will have
available.
The second thing we have learned is that the
returns to getting more education, such as attending
college, are particularly high for those from disadvan-
taged backgrounds. Thus, the limited response of this
group is not because they themselves do not generally
experience high returns. When we have seen interven-
tions such as increasing access to college or cutting
tuition levels and studied them as natural experiments
for estimating the rates of return to schooling, people
Access to education combined
with information seems to have a
very high return for low-income
people with high abilities.
from lower-income households have been the most
affected. These are people on the margin who decide
whether or not to go to school when you change access
or tuition levels. When you estimate their rates of
return, as David Card did in a recent survey, they look
higher than the average difference in earnings be-
tween college- and high-school-educated workers,
which suggests that capital market constraints are
important. That does not mean that we know exactly
the right ways to reduce the cost of education. But
access to education combined with information seems
to have a very high return for low-income people with
high abilities. Policies to prevent dropouts and in-
crease access to college do not work complete mira-
cles, but they are also not that expensive when tar-
geted to those at the margin, for example, in inner
cities.
In another area, we have learned from the Gau-
treaux program and from a number of other quasi-
experimental programs that neighborhoods, and the
spatial concentration of the poor, do seem to matter.
There is no chance in the world that the public will
agree to huge residential dispersion policies, as the
Baltimore experience with the Moving to Opportunity
(MTO) program and the Mt. Laurel decision indicate.
Small-scale attempts have a role, however, as shown
in the current MTO program that, despite Baltimore
talk radio disparagement, is in operation in the Balti-
more metropolitan area as well as in Boston, Chicago,
New York, and Los Angeles.
A striking characteristic of this program is that
the majority of those who agree to participate in it
say that the primary reason they want to move out of
their neighborhood is because of problems with crime
and worry for their children, but they lack the re-
sources to leave public housing. Most claim to have
been victimized by crime within the previous six
months. In terms of transportation, 87 percent of them
do not have cars, and the vast majority do not have
driver’s licenses. It is, therefore, plausible that these
people are not choosing a place to live after evaluat-
ing neighborhood and transportation possibilities,
but rather that public housing is the one place ~vhere
they can get a subsidized living situation. Disper-
sion policies could accomplish a bit here, and what I
call place-based people policies could do a lot more.
This would not be subsidizing employers with tax
breaks for setting up warehouses in enterprise zones,
but rather targeting training and human resources
funds towards areas with greater needs. Such pro-
grams may be less stigmatizing than those based on
individuals’ characteristics, such as the targeted jobs
tax credit.
Finally, good returns may come from greater
investments in improving information for kids. A
number of mentoring programs provide such connec-
tions. Project Strive in Harlem is a good example: It
provides training and two years of follow-up services
for youth, where they try to make connections with
and help resolve problems with employers. States and
localities can do a lot to break down the barriers
between the offices of central-city Job Training Part-
nership Act agencies and suburban employers, pro-
vidh~g co~mections beyond just the transportation lh~k.
In conclusion, massive increases in human capital
investments would be required to overcome the
changes of the past 15 years, increases in the $100-
billion-a-year range for a decade, based on some
estimates by Jim Heckman. We are certainly not going
to embark on such an investment. But in a limited "cut
and invest" budget situation, we cotfld probably tar-
get our money better. States and localities should be
looking at the research on what has worked and what
has not, to determine how to use possible future block
grants and their current resources. Also, these policies
will be more effective in an environment of tighter
labor markets.
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